The Effects of Nuclear War

CASE 2: A U.S. ATTACK ON SOVIET OIL REFINERIES

This case investigates what might happen if the United States tried to inflict as much economic damage as possible on the Soviet Union with 10 SNDVs without seeking to maximize or minimize casualties. Petroleum refineries were selected as targets because of their small number and long construction time, and because of the severe economic consequences of doing without refined petroleum,

The Soviet refining industry is at least as vulnerable as its U.S. counterpart, though the vulnerabilities differ slightly. The United States refines more petroleum than does the U.S.S.R., about 17.9 million barrels per day of crude (1978 figures) versus 11.0 million (1980 projection).² According to a 1977 source, the U.S.S.R. had 59 refineries, including at least 12 under construction, some of which are very large; the U.S. and its territories have at least 288.³ All individual refineries in both nations are highly vulnerable to attacks with nuclear weapons. The U.S. attack destroys most of Soviet refining capacity because the U.S.S.R has few refineries; the Soviet attack destroys most of U.S. refining capacity because U.S. refineries are clustered. The hypothetical attack targets 24 refineries and 34 petroleum storage sites. Some major refineries are beyond range of Poseidon missiles, so the United States uses 7 Poseidons with a total of sixty-four 40-kiloton (kt) RVs and 3 Minuteman IIIs with a total of nine 170-kt RVs. Because of the dispersal of Soviet refineries and limits of footprint size, each footprint had fewer refineries than available RVs. The additional RVs were first allocated 2 on 1 against large refineries; remaining RVs were targeted against petroleum storage complexes. As in the U.S. case, every weapon is assumed to detonate over and destroy its target. It is assumed that all weapons are air burst, and the consequences of using ground bursts are noted where appropriate.

2. “U S. Refining Capacity” (Washington, D.C,: National Petroleum Refiners Association, July 28, 1978), p 1 (U.S. figures), and International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976 (Tulsa, Okla.: Petroleum Publishing Co , 1977), p, 323 (Soviet figures).
3. International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1976, op. cit., p, 393 (Soviet figures); and “U.S. Refining Capacity,” op cit.; passim, (U.S. figures).

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