The Effects of Nuclear War

OVERVIEW

The following pages present descriptions of three “cases” of nuclear attacks. (The tutorial on nuclear effects–chapter II was the first of our four cases.) As mentioned in the Executive Summary, these cases do not necessarily represent “probable” kinds of nuclear attacks; they were chosen rather to shed light on the way in which different types of attacks could have differing effects on the civilian population, economy, and society. Moreover, each case is considered in isolation—events that could lead up to such an attack are deliberately ignored (because their prediction is impossible), and it is assumed (although that assumption is questionable at best) that the attack described is not followed by further nuclear attacks.

Each case considers first a Soviet attack on the United States, and then a U.S. attack on the Soviet Union. These attacks are similar in that they attack similar target sets, but different in detail because both the weapons available to the attacker and the geography of the victim are different. It should be emphasized that this discussion is not suggesting that in the real world an attack would be followed by a mirror image retaliation; rather, it is looking at similar attacks so as to highlight the asymmetries in the ways in which the United States and the Soviet Union are vulnerable. To save space, it is assumed that the reader will read the Soviet attack on the United States in each case before turning to the U.S. attack on the Soviet Union, and repetition has been minimized.

The analyses that follow are much more like sketches than detailed portraits. Precise prediction of the future of the United States or the Soviet Union is impossible even without taking into account something as unprecedented as a nuclear attack. A detailed study would say more about the assumptions used than about the impact of nuclear war. What is possible, and what this report tries to do, is to indicate the kinds of effects that would probably be most significant, and to comment on the major uncertainties.

The following pages discuss the impact on civilian societies of:

• A limited attack on industrial targets. For this case the hypothesis was an attack that would be limited to 10 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) (i. e., 10 missiles or bombers, in this case Soviet SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and U.S. Poseidon submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and Minuteman III ICBMs), and that would be directed at the oil refining industry. Oil refining was chosen as the hypothetical target because it is vital, vulnerable, and concentrated in both countries. It is assumed that the attack would be planned without any effort either to minimize or to maximize civiIian casualties.
• A large counterforce attack. The possibilities considered included both an attack on ICBM silos only (a case that has gained some notoriety as a result of assertions by some that the United States may become vulnerable to such an attack) and an attack on silos, missile submarine bases, and bomber bases (which some characterize as the least irrational way to wage a strategic nuclear war). The analysis draws on several previous studies that made varying assumptions about attack design, weapon size, targets attacked, and vulnerability of the population; the ways in which variations in these assumptions affect the calculations of estimated fatalities are discussed.

A large attack against a range of military and economic targets. This attack is intended to approximate “the ultimate deterrent” —the climax of an escalation process. The description of the results of this attack draws upon several previous studies that made differing assumptions about the number of weapons used and the precise choice of targets, but such variations are useful in indicating the range of possibilities. However, deliberate efforts to kill as many people as possible are not assumed, which would lead to more immediate deaths (perhaps 10 million to 20 million more) than targeting economic and military facilities.

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