The Effects of Nuclear War

Chapter IV

CASE 4: A LARGE SOVIET ATTACK ON U.S. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC TARGETS

The First Few Hours

The devastation caused by a single 1-Mt weapon over Detroit (chapter II), and of two similar weapons denoted near Philadelphia, have been described. In this attack the same destruction would take place in 30 or so other major cities (with populations of a million or greater). Many cities with smaller populations would also be destroyed. The effects on U.S. society would be catastrophic.

The majority of urban deaths will be blast induced, e.g., victims of collapsing buildings, flying debris, being blown into objects, etc. Except for administering to the injured, the next most pressing thing (probably ahead of handling the dead) for most survivors would be to get reliable information about what has occurred, what is taking place, and what is expected. Experience has shown that in a disaster situation, timely and relevant information is critical to avoiding panic, helpful in organizing and directing productive recovery efforts, and therapeutic to the overall psychological and physical well being of those involved. Presumably, the civil preparedness functions would be operating well enough to meet some of this need.

Rescuing and treating the injured will have to be done against near insurmountable odds. Fire and rescue vehicles and equipment not destroyed will find it impossible to move about in any direction. Fires will be raging, water mains will be flooding, powerlines will be down, bridges will be gone, freeway overpasses will be collapsed, and debris will be everywhere. People will be buried under heavy debris and structures, and without proper equipment capable of lifting such loads, the injured cannot be reached and will not survive. The fortunate ones that rescuers can reach will then be faced with the unavailability of treatment facilities. Hospitals and clinics in downtown areas would likely have been destroyed along with most of their stocks of medical supplies. Doctors, nurses, and technicians needed to man makeshift treatment centers are likely to have been among the casualties. The entire area of holocaust will be further numbed by either the real or imagined danger of fallout. People will not know whether they should try to evacuate their damaged city, or attempt to seek shelter from fallout in local areas and hope there will be no new attacks. No doubt some of both would be done.

If this situation were an isolated incident or even part of a small number of destroyed cities in an otherwise healthy United States, outside help would certainly be available. But if 250 U.S. cities are struck and damaged to similar levels, then one must ask, “Who is able to help?” Smaller towns are limited in the amount of assistance they can provide their metropolitan neighbors. It is doubtful that there would be a strong urge to buck the tide of evacuation in order to reach a place where most of the natives are trying to leave. Additionally, the smaller cities and towns would have their own preparedness problems of coping with the anticipated arrival of fallout plus the influx of refugees. In light of these and other considerations, it appears that in an attack of this magnitude, there is Iikely not to be substantial outside assistance for the targeted areas until prospective helpers are convinced of two things: the attack is over, and fallout intensity has reached safe levels. Neither of these conditions is likely to be met in the first few hours.