The Effects of Nuclear War
Chapter IV
CASE 3: A COUNTERFORCE ATTACK AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION
The Shelter Period
If bomber bases (or airfields with long runways that were attacked even though no bombers were present) are attacked, tactical warning could be of great importance to people living nearby. There would be an area near each base (roughly, the area more than 1 mile [2 km] but less than 10 miles [16 km] from a surface burst) in which people who were sheltered at the moment of the blast would have a much greater chance of survival than those who were unsheltered. Soviet civil defense plans envisage that civilians in such high-threat areas would receive some warning, but it cannot be said to what extent this would actually be the case.
Many millions of Soviet citizens live in areas that would receive substantial amounts of fallout from such an attack. Those far enough away from the explosions to be safe from blast darnage would have some time (a range from 30 minutes to more than a day) to shelter themselves from fallout, but evacuation from high-fallout areas after the attack would probably not be feasible. The Soviet civil defense program gives attention to blast shelters rather than fallout shelters in urban areas (see chapter III), and while such blast shelters would offer good protection against fallout, some of them may not be habitable for the necessary number of days or weeks for which protection would be required.
The sheltering process would be much more tightly organized than in the United States. The Soviet Government has extensive civil defense plans, and while Americans would expect to try to save themselves under general guidance (informational in character) from the Federal authorities, Soviet citizens would expect the Government to tell them what to do. This introduces a further uncertainty: efficient and timely action by the authorities would be very effective, but it is also possible that Soviet citizens would receive fatal radiation doses while waiting for instructions or following mixed-up instructions. In any event, some hours after the attack would see a situation in which a large number of people in contaminated areas were in fallout shelters, others were receiving dangerous doses of radiation, and those outside the fallout areas were congratulating themselves on their good luck while hoping that no further attacks would take place.
Would Soviet shelterers be better off than their American counterparts? They have several advantages. They are more accustomed to crowding and austerity than are Americans, so would probably suffer less “shelter shock.” They would be more accustomed to following Government orders, so to the extent that orders proved correct and were correctly implemented, they would be more evenly distributed among shelters. Training in first aid and civil defense is widespread, which would improve people’s ability to survive in shelters. If the U.S. attack used low-yield warheads, fallout would be less widespread and less intense.
Soviet shelterers face some problems that Americans would not. They would be more vulnerable than Americans to an attack in winter. The Soviet economy has less “fat,” so other things being equal, Soviet citizens could bring less food and supplies into shelters than could Americans.
Public health is a major uncertainty. To the extent that shelters are well stocked, provided with adequate medications and safe ventilation, have necessary sanitary facilities, are warm and uncrowded, and have some people with first aid knowledge, health would be less of a problem. If Soviet citizens receive less fallout than Americans, they would be less weakened by radiation sickness and more resistant to disease. If conditions were austere but reasonably healthy, public health in shelters would be mainly a matter of isolating ill people and practicing preventive medicine for the others. Doctors would be unnecessary for most such tasks; people trained in first aid, especially if they have some access (by phone or radio) to doctors, could perform most tasks. To be sure, some people would die from being untreated, but the number would be relatively small if preventive care worked. However, isolating the ill would not be easy. It is likely that many people would be moderately ill (from flu, etc.) when they entered their shelter, and radiation would make the others more susceptible to contamination. The Soviet Government might send medical teams to contaminated areas, especially to shelters containing workers with key skills. The Soviet Army has built tanks and some other military vehicles with protection against fallout, and has trained its soldiers for operations in areas contaminated with fallout. In addition, as in the United States, military helicopters could ferry people and supplies into contaminated areas with limited exposure to crews. Using such resources would obviously improve health of shelterers, but priority military tasks might make these military resources unavailable.
People in hasty shelters, if they could be built, would face worse health problems, despite the legendary ability of Russians to endure hardships. Presumably these shelters would have inadequate supplies, heat, air filtration, sanitary facilities, waterproofing, and so on. Placing people in a cold, damp hole in the ground for 2 weeks with little food and makeshift toilets would make many people sick even in peacetime; how well would such problems be overcome in war?
Soviet civil defense presents a large question mark. Some believe that the Soviets have massive food stockpiles, meticulous plans detailing where each person should go, ample shelter spaces, subways and buildings convertible to shelters, and so on that would be valuable in the shelter period. Others contend that these claims are vastly overstated and confuse speculation about a plan with its existence and the existence of a plan with its operational effectiveness. (See chapter III on civil defense.) If Soviet civil defense works well, it would save many lives; if it doesn’t, Soviet shelterers would face conditions at least as hazardous as their American counterparts.
Agricultural losses would, as in the United States, depend on the time of the year when the attack came and on the precise patterns of fallout. In general, Soviet agriculture appears more vulnerable because it borders on inadequacy even in peacetime–even relatively minor damage would hurt, and major crop losses could be catastrophic. On the other hand, for this very reason the Soviets would know how to handle agricultural shortages: surviving production and stockpiles (the extent of Soviet food stockpiles is a matter of controversy, apart from the fact that they are lowest just before each harvest) would probably be used efficiently.
The economy outside the contaminated area would continue to function. There would be more than enough industrial facilities in uncontaminated areas to keep necessary production going. The key task facing Government planners, however, would be using available workers and resources to best advantage. How fast could planners generate new economic plans that were detailed enough for that task? Because the Soviet economy operates closer to the margin than does that of the United States, the Soviets could tolerate less loss of production than could the United States. This would make superproduction the norm, with key factories working all the time. It would lead to suspending production of many consumer goods. It would probably lead the Government to begin decontamination earlier and to take more risks with radiation exposure than would the United States. These actions to increase production would be aided in general by the Government’s control of the economy, and in particular by keeping work groups together in shelters and host areas.