The Effects of Nuclear War

Chapter III

U.S. AND SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE

U.S. Civil Defense

U.S. attitudes have been ambivalent toward civil defense ever since the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 responded to the first Soviet test of atomic bombs in 1949. Indeed, much of the U.S. civil defense was a reaction to external factors rather than part of a carefully thought-through program. The “duck and cover” program and the evacuation route program, both of the early 1950’s, responded to the threat of Soviet atomic bombs carried by manned bombers. Lack of suitable protection against fire and blast led to plans for rapid evacuation of cities during the several hours separating radar warning and the arrival of Soviet bombers.

The first Soviet test of thermonuclear weapons in 1953 necessitated changes in these plans. The much higher yield of these weapons meant that short-distance evacuations and modestly hard blast shelters in cities were ineffective for protecting people, and that simply “ducking” in school corridors, while perhaps better than nothing, was not part of a serious civil defense plan. H-bombs also raised the specter of radioactive fallout blanketing large areas of the country. Previously, civil defense could be conceptualized as moving people a short distance out of cities, while the rest of the country would be unscathed and able to help the target cities. Fallout meant that large areas of the country—the location of which was unpredictable— would become contaminated, people would be forced to take shelter in those areas, and their inhabitants, thus pinned down, would be unable to offer much help to attacked cities for several weeks.

The advent of ICBMs necessitated further changes. Their drastically reduced warning times precluded evacuations on radar warning of attack.

With previous plans made useless by advances in weapons technology, the United States cast around for alternative plans. One approach was to identify and stock fallout shelters, while recognizing the impracticability of protecting people from blast. After the Berlin crisis of 1961, the President initiated a program to provide fallout shelters for the entire population. The National Shelter Survey Program was commenced on a crash basis. The President proposed:

  1. the survey, identification, and stocking of existing shelters;
  2. the subsidization of fallout shelter installation in new construction; and
  3. the construction of single-purpose fallout shelters where these were needed.

Only the first step in this program was authorized. The Government also urged people to build home fallout shelters.

The civil defense program was broadened in the early 1970’s to include preparedness for peacetime as well as wartime disasters. The 1970’s also saw a new emphasis on operational capabilities of all available assets, including warning systems, shelters, radiological detection instruments and trained personnel, police and fire-fighting forces, doctors and hospitals, and experienced management. This development program was called On-Site Assistance.

In the mid-1970’s, contingency planning to evacuate city and other high-risk populations during a period of severe crisis was initiated.

At present, U.S. civil defense has the following plans and capabilities:

Organization. – The Federal civil defense function has been repeatedly reorganized since the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950. The most recent organization gave prime responsibility for civil defense to the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCP A), housed in the Defense Department. The Federal Preparedness Agency (FPA) in the General Services Administration conducts some planning for peacetime nuclear emergencies, economic crises, continuity of Government following a nuclear attack, and other emergencies. The Federal Disaster Assistance Administration (FDAA), in the Department of Housing and Urban Development, is concerned with peacetime disaster response. In 1978, Congress assented to a Presidential proposal to reorganize civil defense and peacetime disaster functions into a single agency, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which will incorporate DC PA, FPA, FDAA, and other agencies.

Civil Protection. -The United States is looking increasingly at crisis relocation (CR), under which city-dwellers would move to rural “host” areas when an attack appeared likely. CR would require several days of warning, so it would be carried out during a crisis rather than on radar warning of missile launch. The United States has conducted surveys to identify potential fallout shelters in host areas, and blast and fallout shelters in risk areas. Through FY 1971, about 118,000 buildings had been marked as shelters; about 95,000 other buildings have been identified as potential shelters but have not been marked. Marking would be done in crises. In the early 1960’s, the Federal Government purchased austere survival supplies for shelters. The shelf life of these supplies has expired; shelter stocking is now to be accomplished during a crisis.

Direction and Control. –The Federal Government has several teletype, voice, and radio systems for communicating in crises between DCPA, FDAA, and FPA headquarters, regional offices, States, and Canada. State and local governments are planning to integrate communication systems into this net. DCPA has eight regions, each with emergency operating centers (EOCs). Six of these centers are hardened against nuclear blast. Forty-three States have EOCs, and EOCs with fallout protection are operational or under development in locales including about half the population.

Attack Warning. –Warning can be passed over the National Warning System to over 1,200 Federal, State, and local warning points, which operate 24 hours a day. Once warning has reached local levels, it is passed to the public by sirens or other means. Almost half of the U.S. population is in areas that could receive outdoor warning within 15 minutes of the issue of a national warning. Dissemination of warning to the public, however, is inadequate in many places.

Emergency Public Information. –Fallout protection, emergency power generators, and remote units have been provided for radio stations in the Emergency Broadcast System, to permit broadcast of emergency information under fallout conditions. About a third of the stations are in high-risk areas and could be destroyed by blast. A program has been initiated to protect 180 stations from electromagnetic pulse (EMP). About one-third of the more than 5,000 localities participating in the civil defense program have reported development of plans to provide the public with information in emergencies.

Radiological Defense. — This function encompasses radiological detection instruments, communication, plans and procedures, and personnel trained to detect and evaluate radiological hazards. Between FY 1955-74, the Federal Government had procured about 1.4 million rate meters, 3.4 million dose meters, and related equipment. Effective radiological defense would require an estimated 2.4 million people to be trained as radiological monitors in a crisis.

Citizen Training. –The civil defense program

once provided substantial training for the public via news media must now be relied on to educate citizens on hazards and survival actions. DCP A offers classroom and home study training for civil defense personnel.

Several points emerge from this discussion:

  1. On paper, civil defense looks effective. The United States has more than enough identified fallout shelter spaces for the entire population, which include underground parking, subways, tunnels, and deep basement potential blast shelters. The United States has a vast network of highways and vehicles; every holiday weekend sees a substantial urban evacuation. CB and other radios can aid communication after an attack. The United States has enormous resources (food, medical supplies, electrical-generating capability, etc. ) beyond the minimum needed for survival.
  2. However, no one at all thinks that the United States has an effective civil defense.
  3. U.S. civil defense capability is weakened because some elements are in place while others are not or have not been maintained. Shelters will not support life if their occupants have no water. Evacuation plans will save fewer people if host areas have inadequate shelter spaces and supplies, or if people are poorly distributed among towns.
  4. Faced with drastic technological change, moral and philosophical questions about the desirability of civil defense, and budgetary constraints, Federal plans have been marked by vacillation, shifts in direction, and endless reorganization.