Niels Bohr's Memorandum to President Roosevelt
July, 1944
It certainly surpasses the imagination of anyone to survey the consequences of the project in years to come, where, in the long run, the enormous energy sources which will be available may be expected to revolutionize industry and transport. The fact of immediate preponderance is, however, that a weapon of an unparalleled power is being created which will completely change all future conditions of warfare.
Quite apart from the question of how soon the weapon will be ready for use and what role it may play in the present war, this situation raises a number of problems which call for the most urgent attention. Unless, indeed, some agreement about the control of the use of the new active materials can be obtained in due time, any temporary advantage, however great, may be outweighed by a perpetual menace to human security.
Ever since the possibilities of releasing atomic energy on a vast scale came in sight, much thought has naturally been given to the question of control, but the further the exploration of the scientific problems concerned is proceeding, the clearer it becomes that no kind of customary measures will suffice for this purpose, and that the terrifying prospect of a future competition between nations about a weapon of such formidable character can only be avoided through a universal agreement in true confidence.
In this connection it is particularly significant that the enterprise, immense as it is, has still proved far smaller than might have been anticipated, and that the progress of the work has continually revealed new possibilities for facilitating the production of the active materials and of intensifying their efforts.
The prevention of a competition prepared in secrecy will therefore demand such concessions regarding exchange of information and openness about industrial efforts, including military preparations, as would hardly be conceivable unless all partners were assured of a compensating guarantee of common security against dangers of unprecedented acuteness.
The establishment of effective control measures will of course involve intricate technical and administrative problems, but the main point of the argument is that the accomplishment of the project would not only seem to necessitate but should also, due to the urgency of mutual confidence, facilitate a new approach to the problems of international relationship.
The present moment where almost all nations are entangled in a deadly struggle for freedom and humanity might, at first sight, seem most unsuited for any committing arrangement concerning the project. Not only have the aggressive powers still great military strength, although their original plans of world domination have been frustrated and it seems certain that they must ultimately surrender, but even when this happens, the nations united against aggression may face grave causes of disagreement due to conflicting attitudes toward social and economic problems.
A closer consideration, however, would indicate that the potentialities of the project as a means of inspiring confidence under these very circumstances acquire real importance. Moreover, the present situation affords unique possibilities which might be forfeited by a postponement awaiting the further development of the war situation and the final completion of the new weapon.
In view of these eventualities the present situation appears to offer a most favorable opportunity for an early initiative from the side which by good fortune has achieved a lead in the efforts of mastering mighty forces of nature hitherto beyond human reach.
Without impeding the immediate military objectives, an initiative, aiming at forestalling a fateful competition, should serve to uproot any cause of distrust between the powers on whose harmonious collaboration the fate of coming generations will depend.
Indeed, it would appear that only when the question is raised among the united nations as to what concessions the various powers are prepared to make as their contribution to an adequate control arrangement, will it be possible for any one of the partners to assure himself of the sincerity of the intentions of the others.
Of course, the responsible statesmen alone can have insight as to the actual political possibilities. It would, however, seem most fortunate that the expectations for a future harmonious international co-operation, which have found unanimous expressions from all sides within the united nations, so remarkably correspond to the unique opportunities which, unknown to the public, have been created by the advancement of science.
Many reasons, indeed, would seem to justify the conviction that an approach with the object of establishing common security from ominous menaces, without excluding any nation from participating in the promising industrial development which the accomplishment of the project entails, will be welcomed, and be met with loyal co-operation in the enforcement of the necessary far-reaching control measures.
It is in such respects that helpful support may perhaps be afforded by the world-wide scientific collaboration which for years has embodied such bright promises for common human striving. Personal connections between scientists of different nations might even offer means of establishing preliminary and unofficial contact.
It need hardly be added that any such remark or suggestion implies no underrating of the difficulty and delicacy of the steps to be taken by the statesmen in order to obtain an arrangement satisfactory to all concerned, but aims only at pointing to some aspects of the situation which might facilitate endeavors to turn the project to the lasting benefit of the common cause.