Information on Nuclear Smuggling Incidents
Since the early 1990s, there have been numerous reports of illicit trafficking in many types of nuclear materials worldwide. According to IAEA, nuclear materials include nuclear source material, such as natural uranium, depleted uranium, thorium, plutonium, and uranium enriched in the isotopes U-233 or U-235. Plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)—known as weapons usable material-are considered to pose the greatest proliferation risk because they are used to produce nuclear weapons. In 1993, IAEA established a database to record incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials. Sixty-nine countries, or about one-half of IAEA's member states, currently participate in the database. As of December 31, 2001, IAEA listed 181 confirmed incidents involving the illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, including weapons-usable material. According to IAEA, a confirmed incident is one in which the information has been verified to IAEA through official points of contact from the reporting country. Of the 181 confirmed illicit trafficking incidents reported by IAEA, 17 involved either HEU or plutonium. More than half of the 17 incidents involving weapons-usable material occurred during 1993-95. The remaining cases occurred during 1999-2001.
Nuclear Smuggling Incidents Involving Weapons-Usable Material since 1992
| Date | Source of material | Country where material seized |
Material/quantity | How material was found |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| May 1992 | Russia (Luch Scientific Production Assoc.) |
Russia | 1.5 kilograms (90 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| May 1993 | Russia | Lithuania | 0.1 kilogram (50 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| July 1993 | Russia | Russia | 1.8 kilograms (36 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| November 1993 | Russia | Russia | 4.5 kilograms (20 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| March 1994 | Russia | Russia | 3.05 kilograms (90 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| May 1994 | Unspecified | Germany | 0.006 kilograms plutonium-239 | Police investigation |
| June 1994 | Russia | Germany | 0.0008 kilograms (87.8 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| July 1994 | Russia | Germany | 0.00024 kilograms plutonium | Police investigation |
| August 1994 | Russia | Germany | 0.4 kilograms of plutonium | Police investigation |
| December 1994 | Russia | Czech Republic | 2.7 kilograms (87.7 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| June 1995 | Russia | Czech Republic | 0.0004 grams (87.7 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| June 1995 | Russia | Czech Republic | 0.017 kilograms (87.7 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| June 1995 | Russia | Russia | 1.7 kilograms (21 percent HEU) |
Police investigation |
| May 1999 | Russia | Bulgaria | 0.004 kilograms of HEU | Interdiction at border by Bulgarian customs. |
| October 1999 | Unspecified | Kyrgyzstan | 0.0015 kilograms of plutonium | Police investigation |
| April 2000 | Unspecified but Russia suspected | Georgia | 0.9 kilograms of HEU (30 percent) | Possible combination of radiation detection equipment at border and police investigation |
| September 2000 | Possibly Russia and/or Ukraine |
Georgia | 0.0004 kilograms of plutonium | Police investigation |
| December 2000 | Germany | Germany | Less than 1 milligram of plutonium | Radioactive contamination disclosed in a test. |
| January 2001 | Unspecified | Greece | Approximately 0.003 kilograms of plutonium | Police investigation |
| July 2001 | Unspecified | France | About 0.005 kilograms of HEU (approximately 80 percent enriched) | Police investigation |
Note: Uranium enriched with 20 percent or higher U-235 is considered weapons-usable material. One kilogram equals 2.2 pounds. One thousand grams equal 1 kilogram and 1 gram is equal to about 0.04 ounces, or the weight of a paperclip.
Source: GAO Report, May 2002: NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning